Dr Sizo Nkala

South Africa is holding the rotational G20 presidency this year. This means that the country will be in a position to influence much of the agenda of a group that has dubbed itself the “premier forum for international economic cooperation”.

It will also host the G20 Summit at the end of the year. The spotlight will also be trained on the newest member of the group, the African Union (AU), which was invited to join the G20 as a permanent member in 2023. Being the largest regional organization in the world with 55 member states representing 1.4 billion people, the accession of the AU to the G20 was long overdue.

This is not least because, with a growing middle class comprising over 300 million people and a young population with a median age of just 19 years, Africa is set to play an increasingly important role in the global economy as a significant market and innovation hub in the near future. Further, the events of the last few years such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict have shown that global economic shocks have a disproportionate impact on poor regions like Africa.

Hence, a need to strengthen African representation in a forum that shapes global economic policy. While a few doubt the necessity of having the AU represented at the G20, many worry about its ability to effectively advance African interests on this influential platform.

Part of the reason there are doubts over the AU’s participation in the G20 is because of the complexity of the organization. The AU is an inter-governmental organization comprising 55 widely diverse member states who make decisions by consensus.

Arriving at a collective decision in a set-up like that is not easy. For the organization to participate effectively in the G20 it has to speak with one voice. This presumes that the member states must agree on the AU’s negotiation strategy and the issues its representatives must focus on.

Although the AU evolved the Common African Position (CAP) mechanism in 2014 in preparation for the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit in 2015, member states hardly achieved consensus on any issue. To address this, the 2024 AU Assembly Summit adopted six foundational priorities that are going to guide the organization’s participation for the next three years.

The implementation of the AU Agenda 2063, enhancing food security, the reform of the international financial system, attracting investment to support the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), developing vaccine manufacturing capacity, and just energy transition were the priorities identified by the continental.

Later in the year in October, the AUC reiterated these priorities in consultation with South Africa which will host the 2025 G20 Summit. Moreover, the AU developed the Modalities for Participation of the AU in the G20 which outline the organization’s approach to its G20 membership. The process of formulating the AU’s talking points is widely consultative and broad-based.

A long list of knowledge partners of the AU including the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Export Import Bank (AFEXIM), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the AU-recognised Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the AU Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) among others are involved in the formulation of negotiating points. The involvement of these diverse organizations will enhance the AU representatives’ competence and legitimacy.

The presence of the PRC which is made up of the representatives of the member states is important in ensuring the political buy-in of the AU’s priorities.

Another critical issue was that of representation of the AU at the G20. The Modalities developed by the organization addressed by delegating the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) to appoint the Sherpa while the Chairperson of the AU Assembly was granted powers to appoint the Sous (deputy) Sherpa.

Albert Muchanga, the Commissioner for Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry and Minerals and Ahmed Bouh of Mauritania was subsequently appointed Sherpa and Sous Sherpa respectively.

The Sherpa will lead the AU delegation and coordinate its participation in the G20 Sherpa Track. This track consists of 15 Working Groups focusing on different areas including agriculture, education, anti-corruption, digital economy, the environment and tourism among other things.

What is discussed in these groups will make up the content of the Summit Declaration. As such, it is important that the AU is adequately represented in all the working groups. A G20 Coordination Unit in the office of the Sherpa was also created to coordinate the policy position of the AU in different G20 working groups.

For the G20 Finance Track which is made up of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, the Chairperson of the AU Specialised Technical Committee (STC) on Finance, Monetary Affairs, Economic Planning and Integration is the designated AU representative.

The Finance Track consists of 7 technical groups aimed at addressing various macroeconomic issues including infrastructure, sustainable finance, international financial architecture and financial policies among others.

AU representation in this track is crucial as it addresses some of the organization’s stated core priorities. In 2024, the AU was not represented in the initial meetings of this track because the position of the STC Chairperson on Finance was vacant. Consistent and adequate representation in the Finance Track is crucial if the AU wishes to influence the trajectory of the global economic policy. At the Summit the organization will be represented by the AUC Chairperson and the AU Assembly Chairperson.

Participating in the G20 processes is an expensive endeavour.

There will be over a hundred meetings held by the various G20 groups throughout the year in South Africa.

The AU needs to ensure that its representatives attending these meetings are adequately catered for.

The organization committed to self-funding its participation in the G20 to safeguard its collective sovereignty. This is a commendable position. However, with 60 percent of the AU’s budget funded by external entities, one wonders whether it will be able to foot the bill of its G20 adventures. Failure to avail adequate resources for the participation of the AU representatives will undermine its ability to influence the agenda of the G20.

Further and quite importantly, the G20 is an informal organization whose decisions are not binding. The implementation of its decisions is dependent on the political will of the G20 members.

The AU will have to marshal its member states to implement the resolutions adopted at the G20. This is a tough ask for an organization whose member states rarely implement their own decisions.

DR SIZO NKALA A Research Fellow at theUniversity of Johannesburg’s Centre for Africa-China Studies