South Africa’s G20 presidency missed the mark

It has been a busy period for South Africa and other members of the group of twenty (G20) countries. Hopes have been high and expectations most likely unrealistic. There has been a flurry of activity and lots of money spent. South Africa appears to have taken its G20 presidency very seriously, or we were diverting. We have so much to deal with internally and within the African continent.

Not to be a party pooper but it is justified to wonder whether it was all worth it. It is curious if we really knew what we wanted to achieve or we were too excited to host the G20 presidency. It doesn’t seem that there was any clear plan and focus. We wanted to do anything and everything that could be done. This is a sure way of not achieving any results, or for mediocre outcomes.

It is the first time that the presidency of the G20 has been by an African country. It is the first time that the G20 Summit of heads of state and government takes place in the African soil. Such an event, a culmination of twelve months of deliberations, should be delivering results that the majority of Africans in Africa and elsewhere should be proud of. 

South Africa said that its presidency of the G20 was to benefit Africa. Arguably, this has not occurred nor the seeds for that planted. Granted, twelve months are most likely insufficient to have a tangible impact. To assess whether South Africa’s G20 presidency would benefit Africa, we have to examine what has been on the agenda of the G20 and the plans that have been put in place. There should be something more concrete than what has been discussed elsewhere or discussed in other initiatives. For instance, we need more than statements about re-configuring global power relations. 

South Africa’s presidency of the G20 came while the African continent was preoccupied, among other things, with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). There remain many issues that have not been addressed for the successful implementation of the AfCFTA. Many such issues were noted even before the AfCFTA was operationalised. The G20 has preoccupied South Africa and many African countries, instead of ensuring that the AfCFTA works well for the African continent. 

The downside of South Africa’s G20 presidency is arguably related to South Africa’s inclination to please everyone, to be everything to all and sundry. Linked to this has been a long list of issues to deal with. Indeed, as the government indicated at the start of our G20 presidency, South Africa’s G20 presidency occurs at the juncture when “the world faces overlapping and mutually reinforcing crises, including climate change, underdevelopment, inequality, poverty, hunger, unemployment, technological changes and geopolitical instability.”

It might very well be in the nature of the G20 to deal with many issues at once even though a year is too short to achieve concrete results if there is no prioritisation. South Africa should have narrowed the agenda and focus on what matters most to the African continent and the global south. The long list of issues and anxiety about the participation of the United States squandered an opportunity to have a lasting impact.

In the G20 agenda has been the initiative to deal with debt in the countries of the global south, including many African countries that are heavily indebted. The G20 has been having a Common Framework for Debt Treatments since 2020. It has gradually been improved over the years. There are still many areas for improvement. Arguably, this is an area that South Africa could have focused on. It is an area in which South Africa and many countries in the G20 as well as in the broader global south have expertise. 

There have been many proposals about what should be improved in the Common Framework for Debt Treatments – there are many lessons from debt restructuring experiences of countries such as Ethiopia, Zambia and Ghana. Essentially, the Common Framework was aimed at ensuring that commercial and official creditors as well as bondholders work in tandem. Put differently, the Common Framework should be better coordinating debt relief for affected countries.

Debt is standing in the way of the socio-economic development of many countries in Africa and the global south broadly. The historical debt that many African countries continue to waste limited resources towards paying off is known to be unjust. It was not caused by the ordinary peoples of the countries that suffer consequences of those debts. Reducing debt or getting rid of such debt would go a long way in advancing wellbeing in Africa and in the affected countries in the broader global south. 

The common factor in both the Common Framework and in the AfCFTA is China. China is a prominent member of the G20 and a “friend” of Africa. As indicated above, the Common Framework requires coordination between official and private creditors, but it has been a challenge to get China and private creditors to have a common approach. China, for instance, continues to enter into bilateral debt agreements with other countries outside the Common Framework. Regarding the AfCFTA, China continues to enter into bilateral trade with African countries while the AfCFTA is about expanding trade in Africa and it discourages bilateral trade.

The argument I am advancing is not meant to suggest that other important issues should not have been on the agenda of South Africa’s G20 presidency. Indeed, climate financing and such issues matter too. The question is what matters most for Africa and the global south. 

China – the elephant in the room – should have been engaged vigorously during SA’s G20 presidency as far as debt arrangements are concerned for African countries. China should be engaged forcefully if the AfCFTA is to succeed. China should be engaged more robustly as far as critical minerals in Africa are concerned. China should be engaged frankly about its activities and behaviour in Africa.

* Professor Vusi Gumede, Durban University of Technology