Sudan… How Did 'Al-Ahmed' Smuggle the Gas of Death Across the Red Sea?

The ongoing crisis in Sudan since mid-April 2023 continues, day after day, to reveal secrets that have largely underpinned the persistence of the bloody conflict between the Sudan Founding Alliance forces “Ta’sis” and the army affiliated with the Port Sudan authority.

The war is approaching its third year amid a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. The Quintet Committee—comprising the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the League of Arab States, the European Union, and the United Nations—has called for immediate measures to halt escalation and prevent atrocities in this African country.

In a press statement dated February 11, 2026, it spoke of “deadly drone strikes, tightened sieges on population centres, attacks targeting vital civilian infrastructure, forced displacement, and severe restrictions on humanitarian access”.

It affirmed the need for “coordinated and effective collective efforts, including by the most influential actors, to de-escalate the conflict and create favourable conditions for the protection of civilians and to halt the flow of weapons, fighters, and other forms of support that fuel violence and contribute to Sudan’s fragmentation”.

Meanwhile, a journalistic investigation has uncovered one of the most complex issues during the ongoing war: the supply of chlorine gas to Sudan—confirmed by investigations to have been used, causing a health crisis among civilians.

Reports have spoken of the emergence of mysterious epidemics spreading with little resistance, transforming the health crisis into yet another symptom of state collapse amid multiple crises.

Beginning of the Case

The investigation revealed that the director of the importing company is Colonel Anas Younis, an active-duty officer in the armed forces who appears in civilian attire to sign contracts and in military uniform during official duties, despite laws prohibiting armed forces personnel from engaging in trade or owning private companies while in active service.

The company used the name “Ports Engineering Company” as a civilian front, claiming specialisation in water treatment to legally justify the importation of chlorine before customs authorities.

According to the investigation, the substance was shipped in 17 massive cylinders (tonners), containers designated for military or heavy industrial use—not civilian cleaning. The cylinders are noted as the military’s preferred option for conversion into improvised bombs or chemical explosive barrels.

The operation was carried out in the summer of 2024 away from international oversight, coinciding with peace negotiations in Jeddah. Containers were transported from India to Jeddah Islamic Port, where they remained for 18 days to arrange their transfer as transit goods.

The Sudanese army exploited facilities granted to Sudanese goods in Saudi Arabia to pass the shipment without rigorous inspection of military contents. On 8 August 2024, the cargo was loaded onto the vessel “Al-Ahmed” (ALAHMED), owned by Baaboud Company, to ensure credible commercial cover. Its route ran India–Jeddah–Sudan.

The investigation indicated that the Defense Industries System handled the logistics, headed by internationally sanctioned drug and captagon smuggler Mirghani Idris, described as the right-hand man of Abdel Fattah alBurhan.

Mirghani Idris was placed under US sanctions in October 2024 for expanding the war and purchasing weapons from external parties such as China and Russia.

Documents described the operation as a “diplomatic betrayal” of Saudi Arabia through the exploitation of its ports to smuggle materials used for military purposes without the authorities’ knowledge.

While the Kingdom was mediating peace, 17 tons of toxic gas were passed through its territory. The vessel unloaded its cargo at the port of Port Sudan on 9 August 2024.

With the arrival of Al-Ahmed in Port Sudan, “the deception operation was crowned with success, and the weapon reached the army’s hands, leaving Saudi Arabia in the position of a state whose infrastructure was exploited to support an illicit war effort without its knowledge.”

International observers, according to the investigation, “had not imagined that the Sudanese army would dare to use the ports of the intermediary state—Saudi Arabia—to smuggle a chemical weapon.”

Health Repercussions

The investigation pointed to cases of suffocation and field distress calls in conflict zones less than a month after the shipment’s arrival, alongside documentation of yellow cylinders matching the shipment found in the field.

These findings aligned with an investigation published by the “Observers” team at France 24, which indicated the use of chlorine gas—typically employed in potable water treatment—as a chemical weapon near an oil refinery north of the Sudanese capital Khartoum on 5 and 13 September 2024.

The investigation explained that during that period “chlorine gas was used as a chemical weapon near the Al-Jaili oil refinery located north of the Sudanese capital Khartoum. At the time, the army was attempting to regain control of this refinery from the Rapid Support Forces.”

It noted that “barrels containing chlorine were dropped from the air, bearing in mind that the Sudanese army is the only party in the conflict that uses military aircraft capable of carrying out such strikes.”

The investigation stated that an Indian company exported the gas to Sudan, asserting that the substance was intended solely “for the treatment of drinking water”.

According to the investigation, “a Sudanese company linked to the Sudanese army—Ports Engineering Company—imported the chlorine gas that was dropped on the Al-Jaili oil refinery between 5 and 13 September 2024”.

Looming Danger

Exposure to chlorine or its compounds can lead to a range of symptoms—from redness and itching to shortness of breath and even death—according to Human Rights Watch.

It stated that the use of chlorine as a weapon constitutes a grave violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The organisation verified the geolocation of images and videos showing metal containers used to store chlorine near small craters, in addition to footage depicting a distinctive yellow-green cloud.

It indicated that all states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should support a transparent investigation conducted by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons through means including a verification procedure known as a “challenge inspection.”

It concluded that the alleged use of a “common industrial chemical as a weapon constitutes a disturbing precedent and threatens international norms that prohibit forms of warfare contrary to the human conscience. States bear the responsibility to act.”

Meanwhile, reports spoke of allegations that the army affiliated with Port Sudan had used chemical weapons in the capital Khartoum and in the central regions of Al-Jazirah and Sennar.

Two U.S. officials told the The New York Times that knowledge of Sudan’s chemical weapons program was confined to a narrow circle within the army and that al-Burhan had authorised their use.

In May 2025, the United States announced that it had concluded the Sudanese government used chemical weapons at least twice during 2024 and imposed sanctions on Sudan accordingly.

* Bayethe Msimang is an independent writer, analyst and political commentator.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.